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Differences That Matter: Canada, the United States and Environmental 
Policymaking 
By Leslie R. Alm and Ross E. Burkhart 
 
Introduction 
Does the way Canada, as a nation state, approach international environmental 
policymaking make a difference with respect to solving environmental problems in the 
Americas? We argue that it does, and it is a difference that matters. Canadian efforts 
toward multilateralism and toward inclusiveness (e.g., willingness to work with weaker 
nations) serve as a counter balance to the growing unilateralism and ever present 
exceptionalism of the United States, currently the most powerful country in the world, 
and Canada’s southern neighbor and regional partner in developing environmental policy 
that affects the northern Americas directly and all of the Americas indirectly. Our 
argument is made first generally, and then specifically using involvement and reaction to 
the goals set out by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), where, along 
with Mexico, Canada and the United States play leading roles. The basic contention of 
this paper is that the vision for and goals of the CEC are much more aligned with the way 
Canada perceives the way international environmental policymaking should be 
implemented, and that by fostering that vision, Canada tries to counter the tendency of 
the present-day United States administration to go at it alone, and thereby provides a 
linkage to other countries in the Americas to position themselves for participation in 
regional environmental policymaking. 
The CEC was created under the auspices of the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a separate agreement between Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States stemming from concern for the environment in the context of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As portrayed by government officials 
in Canada and the United States and as documented by such NAFTA analysts as Andre 
Beaulieu, Daniel C. Esty, Barbara B. Hogenboom, Stewart Hudson, Pierre Marc Johnson, 
Ardadhana Kumar, Jean Milner, Annie Petsonk, J. Timmons Roberts, and David Vogel, 
NAFTA is considered one of the “greenest” multilateral trade agreements ever 
concluded.1 The reasons for such acclaim rests with the heavy emphasis on 
environmental considerations that arose with the creation of the CEC, which is 
considered to be the first international organization in the world that specifically links 
environmental cooperation with trade relations. 2  
The CEC works through three major entities: (1) the Council, which is the governing 
body of the CEC and composed of the highest-ranking environmental authorities from 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico; (2) the Secretariat, which is located in Montreal 
and implements the annual work program by providing administrative, technical and 
operational support to the Council; and (3) the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC), 
which advises the Council on any matters pertinent to the scope of NAAEC and is 
composed of five citizens from each of the three countries. 
The mission of the CEC is to 
                                                 
1 Arthur Mol, Globalization and Environmental Reform (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), 125-126. 
2 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Ten Years of North American Environmental Cooperation 
(Montreal: CEC, 2004), ix. 
[facilitate] cooperation and public participation to foster 
conservation, protection and enhancement of the North 
American environment for the benefit of present and future 
generations, in the context of increasing economic, trade 
and social links among Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States.3 
 
Indeed, the CEC is viewed as an international model because of “its provisions for public 
participation and for the unprecedented commitment by the three governments to account 
internationally for enforcement of their environmental laws.” 4 Essentially, the CEC 
represents a regional model of developing and implementing environmental policy across 
the North American continent. 
 
The Setting: Global Environmental Politics  
There appears no doubt that we now live in an era of global environmental politics,5 
with an increasing focus on global environmental issues,6 an increased integration of 
economic and environmental measures at the international level,7 and a proliferation of 
new multilateral environmental treaties, declarations, strategies, and organizations.8 As 
Martello and Jasanoff state, “The proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements 
in the last quarter of the twentieth century attests to the wholesale adoption of shared 
environmental ontologies among the nations of the Earth.” 9 Mol puts this trend into 
perspective when he speaks of 
 
the construction of global, multilateral or supra-national 
environmental organizations, institutions, and regimes as 
                                                 
3 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Continental Pollutant Pathways (Montreal: CEC, 1997), iv. 
4 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2004, ix. 
5 Ken Conca and Geoffrey Dabelko, Green Planet Blues (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 1; Sheila 
Jasanoff, “Heaven and Earth: The Politics of Environmental Images,” in Earthly Politics: Local and Global 
in Environmental Governance, eds. Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Long Martello (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2004), 32; Clark Miller, “Resisting Empire: Globalism, Relocalizing, and the Politics of 
Knowledge,” in Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance, eds. Sheila Jasanoff and 
Marybeth Martello (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 82. 
6 Gary Bryner, “Global Interdependence,” in Environmental Governance Reconsidered: Challenges, 
Choices, and Opportunities, eds. Robert Durant, Daniel Fiorino, and Rosemary O’Leary (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 2004), 70; Uday Desai, “Institutions and Environmental Policy in Developed Countries,” in 
Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries, ed. Uday Desai (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2002), 16; Michael Hart, “A New Accommodation with the United States: The Trade and Economic 
Dimension,” in The Art of the State II, eds. Thomas Courchene, Donald Savois, and Daniel Schwanen 
(Montreal: Institute for Research and Public Policy, 2004), 21. 
7 Jennifer Clapp, “Responses to Environmental Threats in an Age of Globalization,” in Managing 
Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State, 2nd Edition, eds. Robert Paehlke and 
Douglas Torgensen (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005), 271. 
8 Robyn Eckersley, The Green State (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 28; Robert Paehlke, Democracy’s 
Dilemma (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 265. 
9 Marybeth Martello and Sheila Jasanoff, “Globalization and Environmental Governance,” in Earthly 
Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance, eds. Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Martello 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 6. 
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instruments to contribute to environmental reform of a 
globalizing world.10 
 
There even appears to be a move to push environmental responsibilities away from 
the nation-state and more toward international bodies, states or provinces, and localities.11 
Jasanoff and Martello warn however, “there cannot be a meaningfully accountable, let 
alone a democratic, global order without making room for voices and epistemologies 
organized at levels below the global.”12 In this same vein, Lipschutz argues that local and 
global are so closely bound with respect to environmental politics that understanding one 
without the other would not be possible,13 and Mol posits that globalization, in 
conjunction with the decentralization and localization of environmental governance and 
reform, has led to new political arrangements at the national, sub-national, and 
supranational levels.14 
Despite the move toward the internationalization of environmental policymaking,15 
nation-state domestic policymaking remains crucial in the global arena,16 where it is 
pointedly characterized as “the most important pathway to change.” 17 Because the 
existing network of global environmental regimes is looked upon as “woefully 
inadequate to meet global environmental challenges” 18 and environmental standards 
found in voluntary international agreements are seldom backed up with sanctions for 
noncompliance,19 sovereign nation-states are still viewed as the single most important 
determinants with respect to redirecting “societies and economies along more 
ecologically sustainable lines to address ecological problems.” 20 With this in mind, the 
sections that follow highlight the styles of Canada and the United States as each looks to 
influence environmental policy in the Americas and the world. 
 
The Canada–United States Divergence 
It is at the junction between the nation-state and global governance that Canada and 
the United States take substantially different turns. The United States, explicitly 
                                                 
10 Mol, 205. 
11 Robert Durant, Daniel Fiorino, and Rosemary O’Leary, “Conclusion,” in Environmental Governance 
Reconsidered: Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities, eds. Robert Durant, Daniel Fiorino, and Rosemary 
O’Leary (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 508. 
12 Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Martello, “Knowledge and Governance,” in Earthly Politics: Local and 
Global in Environmental Governance, eds. Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Martello (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2004), 346. 
13 Ronnie Lipschultz, Global Environmental Politics: Power, Perspectives, and Practice (Washington, DC: 
CQ Press, 2004), 7. 
14 Mol, 104. 
15 Desai, 18. 
16 Emmanual Brunet-Jailly, “Toward a Model of Border Studies: What Do We Learn From the Study of the 
Canadian-American Border,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 19, no. 1 (2004): 4; Mol, 110; Paehlke, 2003, 
269. 
17 Conca and Dabelko, 5. 
18 Bryner, 69. 
19 Evan Rinquist and Tatiana Kostadinova, “Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol,” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 1 
(2005): 89. 
20 Eckersley, 7-8. 
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described as “the crusading hegemon” 21 displaying “increasingly muscular American 
unilateralism,” 22 appears to be heading down a road that emphasizes unilateral 
geopolitics,23 while Canada remains committed to following a path firmly committed to 
multilateral institutions.24 
Cox describes the movement of the United States toward a unipolar concept of world 
power, founded on what Americans view as their exceptional historic mission: 
“American ‘exceptionalism’ affirms in practice that the United States is not a state like all 
the others and that American officials, the agents of this special responsibility, cannot be 
subject to other than United States law”.25 Representing its unilateral tendencies at the 
international level, the United States administration—characterized as “the leading point 
of resistance” 26 and as “a laggard in international environmental politics27—has 
dismissed the Kyoto accord on international warming, the biological weapons 
convention, and the United Nations agreement on small arms trafficking.28 This blatant 
rejection of multilateralism by the United States—viewed by many as “casting a pall over 
the prospects for ambitious multilateral environmental diplomacy” 29—runs counter to 
Canada’s vocal and enthusiastic support for such a rule-based international system.30 
Hawes describes Canada’s position quite accurately: 
 
For more than fifty years two basic and interrelated facts 
have shaped and subsequently characterized Canada’s role 
in the world. The first is the disproportionately large role 
that the United States has played in the economic, social, 
cultural, and political lives of Canadians. The second is a 
significant commitment to the principles and the practice of 
multilateral diplomacy and multilateral management.31 
 
In this regard, it appears that many Canadians share a dislike for President George W. 
Bush and his administration. Moreover, this dislike is “broadly shared geographically and 
                                                 
21 Stephen Clarkson and Maria Banda, “Congruence, Conflict, and Continental Governance: Canada’s and 
Mexico’s Responses to Paradigm Shift in the United States,” American Review of Canadian Studies 34, no. 
2 (2004): 313. 
22 Conca and Dabelko, 4. 
23 Steinar Andresen, “Future U.S. Climate Policy: International Re-engagement?” International Studies 
Perspectives 6 (2005): 285. 
24 Donald Alper and David Biette, “Weathering the Storm: The State of the Canada-U.S. Relationship,” 
American Review of Canadian Studies 33, no. 1 (2003): 2); Michael Hawes, “Managing Canada-U.S. 
Relations in Difficult Times,” American Review of Canadian Studies 34, no. 4 (2004): 594; Dwight Mason, 
“Managing the Canada-United States Relationship,” Teaching Canada 23 (2005): 21. 
25 Robert Cox, “Is There a Specifically Canadian Perspective on the World?” Lecture at the Liu Institute for 
Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, January 27, 2005. 
26 Paehlke, 2003, 269. 
27 Norman Vig and Michael Faure, Green Giants: Environmental Policies of the United States and the 
European Union (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 1. 
28 John Herd Thompson, “Playing by the New Washington Rules: The U.S.-Canada Relationship, 1994-
2003,” American Review of Canadian Studies 33, no. 1 (2003): 8. 
29 Conca and Dabelco, 6. 
30 Mason, 21; Thompson, 11. 
31 Hawes, 595. 
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conceptually—across [Canada] and across a wide range of issues.” 32 For instance, over 
80 percent of Canadians believe that the Chrétien government made the correct decision 
in deciding not to participate in the 2003 Iraq War, and a further 76 percent of Canadians 
believe that the federal government has been too soft in its negotiations with the United 
States on resolving the softwood lumber dispute.33 At least part of the reason for this 
dislike is reflected in Bush’s clear and unequivocal statements that reflect the belief that 
if multilateral initiatives are such that they are not pursued in a way acceptable to the way 
the President views the world, the United States will not participate.34 
Canada appears to have accepted the simple fact that in today’s world, as has 
historically been true, it plays “a relatively insignificant role in the dynamics of great 
power rivalry.” 35 Put another way, Canada has come to recognize that it has become “a 
functional part of ‘Empire,’” 36 where ‘Empire’ refers to the United States as the 
dominant military and economic power in the world today. “If Canada’s role in the world 
seemed to be defined more and more by its relationship with the United States, that’s 
because it is.” 37 Having said that, Canada remains committed to a multilateral view of 
the world in hopes of offsetting its absorption into the ‘Empire.’ 38 Along these lines, 
Canada takes special pride in its multicultural society, as it views itself in this light as “a 
microcosm of the whole world,” 39 with a strong multilateral heritage based on 
multilateral rule-making and institution-building.40 
A generally accepted assumption on the part of Canadians is that the United States 
will “always accord their country consideration when calculating the American 
interest.”41 Thompson takes issue with the validity of this assumption, describing 
Canada’s relationship with the United States in the same terms that the United States has 
with all other nations, “uni-lateral.” 42 Simply put, Thompson sees the eternal hopefulness 
of Canadians that the United States can be constrained within a multilateral international 
regime as quite misplaced.43 
Canadian foreign policy has, to be sure, employed unilateralism and bilateralism 
instead of multilateralism. The famous 1911 general election that swept the Liberals of 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier (who favored trade reciprocity with the United States) from power in 
                                                 
32 Hart, 7. 
33 Michael Adams, “Bash thy neighbor,” The Globe and Mail, 19 October 2005. 
34 Lipschutz, 212. 
35 John McDougall, “The Long-run Determinants of Deep/Political Canada-United States Integration,” in 
The Art of the State II, eds. Thomas Courchene, Donald Savois, and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: Institute 
for Research and Public Policy, 2004), 7. 
36 Cox, 10. 
37 Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 2003), 187. 
38 Cox, 10. 
39 Cox, 10. 
40 Hart, 22. 
41 Allan Gottlieb, Wendy Dobson, and Michael Hart, “Bed the Elephant: We Need Much Closer Integration 
with the US-Before It’s Too Late,” Maclean’s 118, no. 13 (2005): 22; Bruce Muirhead, “From Special 
Relationship to Third Option: Canada, The U.S., and the Nixon Shock,” American Review of Canadian 
Studies 34, no. 3 (2004): 439. 
42 Thompson, 6. 
43 Thompson, 19. 
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Ottawa demonstrates the appeal of Canadian unilateralism.44 In addition, the Ogdensburg 
Agreement of 1940, which cemented a bilateral defense bond between Canada and the 
United States, excluding Britain, also demonstrates how Canada has adapted its foreign 
policies to fit the times.45 At present, however, according to Canada’s International 
Policy Statement, “multilateral cooperation remains the only way to tackle some of the 
world’s most pressing problems, such as environmental degradation or global financial 
instability. Collective action is the only viable path to a lasting solution.” 46  
In fact, a strain of thought in Canadian foreign policy circles questions the relevancy 
of a foreign policy partnership with the United States. Canada’s lack of investment in 
foreign policy has caused it to decline in both power and prestige. “Without real 
resources, it is harder for Canada to be taken seriously these days in London and 
Washington, in NATO and at the UN. It no longer speaks with the same authority in the 
international community.” 47 Just in October 2005 alone, Canada has been criticized on 
four international fronts on which it would ordinarily have carried great weight and 
respect. Amnesty International released a report which took the government to task for 
the deportation of people to states known to practice torture.48 Transparency International 
ranked Canada 14th on the Corruptions Perceptions Index, a decline for the third straight 
year.49 The Conference Board of Canada chided Canada for lack of action to arrest the 
decline in productivity, dropping to 12th place in economic performance.50 Pollution 
Watch issued a report that faulted Canada for its lack of movement in reducing air 
pollution: between 1995 and 2003, Canada reduced its emissions by 1.8 percent, while 
the United States reduced its emissions by 45 percent.51 In short, critics of Canadian 
foreign policy conclude that Canada has not proven it should be taken seriously as a 
foreign policy actor; rhetoric is no substitute for constructive action. 
Along these same lines, Clarkson and Banda document the recent emergence of a 
United States-centered bilateralism that minimizes the prospects for any type of 
continental convergence occurring in North America.52 Furthermore, Segal claims that 
North American integration has not, and never will be, a central element of the United 
States domestic debate.53 Instead, “U.S. political institutions within the paradigm of 
North American regional integration…are here to stay.” 54 Hart gets right to the point, 
insisting that Canadians, especially, must be careful about making sure they are engaged 
                                                 
44 J.L. Granatstein, Irving M. Abella, David J. Bercunson, R. Craig Brown, and H. Blair Neatby, Twentieth 
Century Canada, 2nd Edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1986), 67. 
45 Desmond Morton, A Short History of Canada, 5th Edition (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 2001), 
234. 
46 Government of Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the 
World (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2005), 27. 
47 Cohen, 187. 
48 Jeff Sallot, “Canada chided over rights,” The Globe and Mail, 14 October 2005. 
49 Campbell Clark, “Canada’s reputation loses some lustre,” The Globe and Mail, 18 October 2005. 
50 Heather Scoffield, “Canada lags, productivity ranking says,” The Globe and Mail, 18 October 2005. 
51 Jeff Sallot, “Canada weak on air pollution,” The Globe and Mail, 13 October 2005. 
52 Clarkson and Banda, 337-339. 
53 Hugh Segal, “The Politics of Enhanced Canada-United States Relations.” Speech at the University of 
British Columbia, Vancouver, November 27, 2004. 
54 Ross E. Burkhart, “National Institutions and Politics in the United States,” in North American Politics: 
Globalization and Culture, eds. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Radha Jhappan, and Francois Rocher. Peterborough, 
Ontario: Broadview Press. 
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at all levels, as there appears to be a natural tendency, without this engagement, to “drift 
toward United States-determined default positions.” 55 
Still, Canadians cling to a strategy of hopefulness, “increasingly reaching across 
borders to network with allies, to lobby governments and corporations that have dealings 
with the Canadian government, and to bring external pressures to bear on the Canadian 
government.” 56 They put their faith in the commonly accepted belief that “the degree of 
global interdependence is now such that even superpowers need the cooperation of other 
states in the longer run.” 57  
Canadians can take some measure of hope in this regard, as many foresee a rise of 
environmental multilateralism, characterized by “the emergence of environmental 
advocacy within civil society and of new democratic discursive designs within the 
administrative state.” 58 Canadians can take heart in what some believe to be a move 
toward greater influence for multilateralism in the environmental realm: 
 
[M]obilizing at the domestic level can have important 
multilateral consequences over time, as a small number of 
relatively green democratic states emerge to take leadership 
roles in multilateral negotiations, and whose credibility 
rests in part on their successful domestic environmental 
initiatives and records.59  
 
At this time in history it appears that Canadians, as a whole, appear less threatened by 
their relationship to the United States—viewing their proximity in a positive light, as 
something to take advantage of rather than to feel threatened by.60 Perhaps this optimism 
comes from the fact that Canada and the United States not only share fundamental values 
and goals,61 but also share a vital interest in their relationship; a relationship built on 
mutual trust and confidence.62 
Americans as a whole remain unaware and uninterested in the United States–Canada 
relationship as well as Canada and Canadians in general.63 On the northern side of the 
border, anti-Americanism remains a staple of Canadian thought and perceptions.64 
Moreover, Canadians continually point to the uniqueness of their country (as compared to 
the United States):  
 
the official constitutional enshrinement of both French–
English biculturalism and multiculturalism; a more 
                                                 
55 Hart, 18. 
56 Conca and Dabelko, 67. 
57 Eckersley, 253. 
58 Eckersley, 15. 
59 Eckersley, 252. 
60 Hart, 38. 
61 Paul Cellucci, “The Ties That Bind: The Common Borders and Uncommon Values of Canada-U.S. 
Relations.” Remarks made to the Association of Canadian Studies in the United States, Vancouver, British 
Columbia, October 29, 2004. 
62 Hart, 17. 
63 Thompson, 16. 
64 Thompson, 17-18. 
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welcoming attitude to immigrants; a more generous welfare 
state that includes a national health care delivery system; 
the existence of a social democratic party and a more 
effective labor movement; more generous government 
recognition of native peoples; livable cities in which 
citizens experience much lower levels of urban violence; 
and effective gun laws and a murder rate a tenth of that in 
America.65 
 
Canada As An International Environmental Leader 
Despite the fact that economic globalism has seemingly diminished Canada’s 
capacity to engage in across-the-board, proactive multilateralism, Canada continues to 
push an environmental agenda that reflects the pursuit of what some argue are purely 
Canadian values—the pursuit and promotion of the virtues of multilateralism and 
international institutions.66 In this light, Canada has used the international stage for the 
germination of environmental policy ideas, gaining a “positive international image on the 
environmental front.” 67 For instance, during the acid rain debate that permeated the 
1980s and early 1990s, the Canadian government invited ten nations to Ottawa for a two-
day International Conference of Ministers that resulted in the formation of the 30 Percent 
Club, a group of nations agreeing to reduce SO2 emissions by 30 percent over ten years.68 
Moreover, Canada was one of only a few nations that made a pledge to unilaterally 
reduce SO2 emissions by 50 percent.69 Over the years it has been actions of this type—
where Canada has advocated for progressive environmental solutions—that has earned 
Canada the reputation of being an active environmental policy entrepreneur.70 
Canadians view global leadership with respect to environmental protection as a way 
to gain prestige within the world community and take pride in their efforts to bring about 
global environmental cooperation. They perceive themselves as “enthusiastic joiner[s] of 
international agreements” and embodied with “a strong internationalist tradition.” 71 At 
the state level, Canada draws on a reservoir of “internationally recognized contributions 
to global environmental leadership,” 72 with governments around the world increasingly 
                                                 
65 Thompson, 19. 
66 Robert Boardman, “Milk-and-Potatoes Environmentalism: Canada and the Turbulent World of 
International Law,” in Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases, 2nd Edition, eds. Debora 
VanNijnatten and Robert Boardman (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2002), 197. 
67 Robert Paehlke, “Environmentalism in One Country: Canadian Environmental Policy in an Era of 
Globalization,” Policy Studies Journal 28, no. 1 (2000): 161. 
68 Marvin Soroos, The Endangered Atmosphere (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1997), 128. 
69 Soroos, 128. 
70 Neil Harrison, “Political Responses to Changing Uncertainty in Climate Science,” in Science and Politics 
in the International Environment, eds. Neil Harrison and Gary Bryner (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2004), 121. 
71 Glen Toner, “Contesting the Green: Canadian Environmental Policy at the Turn of the Century,” in 
Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries, ed. Uday Desai (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2002), 73. 
72 Boardman, 194. 
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looking toward Canada “as the world’s most successful pluralist state.” 73 Furthermore, 
Canada pursues its domestic environmental policy goals through international means and 
uses its middle-power statecraft as a way to affect policy change in the international 
arena,74 gaining “a reputation as one of the world’s most ecologically minded nations.” 75  
This tendency toward multilateral relations is characterized as an “intrinsic, 
substantial, and growing feature of environmental policy in Canada,” 76 one that plays 
directly to the values that Canadians believe are the foundation of their existence—the 
rule of law, liberty, democracy, equality of opportunity, and fairness.77 Wood sums up 
Canada’s unique view toward the world outside its borders: 
 
Canada…does not get its influence from power but from 
cooperation, supporting proposals, enthusiasm, forming 
coalitions, willingness to work with weaker nations, and 
contributing more than its fair share. Canada has a focus on 
values like understanding the social aspects of 
globalization; a need for a fair process to ensure 
legitimization; a sharing of the burdens and the focus on 
legitimization.78 
 
Still, Canada is not sitting idly by, waiting for this special status to somehow appear 
without warning. Canada continually reaches out to the international community in ways 
that build upon its commitment to improving its status and influence at the global level, 
as well as with the United States. Canada clearly recognizes its asymmetric relationship 
with its powerful neighbor and looks beyond its borders for ways to foster values 
important to the Canadian way of life while, at the same time, gaining some leverage in 
its bilateral relations with the United States and influence on the international stage. 
There is a glaring weakness to the Canadian position on the environment, however: 
the gap between Canadian rhetoric and reality has been considerable at times. For 
example, Canada’s lofty statements regarding the Kyoto Agreement are not matched by 
equally ambitious policies. In fact, Canada’s position on Kyoto “was only slightly 
‘greener’ for symbolic purposes” than that of the United States.79 Also, Canada’s ranking 
in global environmental performance has been rated mediocre at best by several global 
environmental tracking organizations. The most recent, The David Suzuki Foundation’s 
The Maple Leaf in the OECD: Comparing Progress Toward Sustainability, ranked 
Canada 28th out of 30 OECD countries in environmental performance, based on an 
                                                 
73 John Ibbitson, “Pluralism: the world wonders how we pulled it off,” The Globe and Mail, 6 February 
2004, page A21. 
74 Robert Boardman, Canadian Environmental Policy: Ecosystems, Politics, and Process (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 237. 
75 Howard Schneider, “Economy, Ecology Lock Horns: Canada Redefines Relationship With the Land,” 
Washington Post, 27 October 1997, page A01. 
76 Boardman, 1992, 224. 
77 Paul Martin, “Speech From the Throne.” Ottawa, Ontario, February 2, 2004. 
78 Duncan Wood. Seminar discussion, Biennial Meeting of the Association for Canadian Studies in the 
United States, Portland, Oregon, November 23, 2003. 
79 Karen T. Litfin, “Advocacy Coalitions along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Globalization and Canadian 
Climate Change Policy,” Policy Studies Journal 28, no. 1 (2000): 250. 
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assessment of such goals as shifting to cleaner forms of energy, reducing waste and 
pollution, and protection of water source and conservation.80 
 
Canadian Values and the CEC 
Based on the discussion above, it appears that international environmental 
policymaking, because of its necessarily cooperative orientation, becomes more desirable 
to countries like Canada than the United States. Simply put, the different orientations 
toward international politics espoused by Canada and the United States serve to 
differentiate their approaches to international environmental policymaking. Canada tends 
toward multilateralism, inclusiveness, and global interdependence, with a firm 
commitment to multilateral institutions and multilateral rule making. The United States 
tends toward unilateralism and exceptionalism, with an emphasis toward unilateral 
geopolitics and a belief that the United States will not be subjected to any other rules than 
United States law. However, if the United States’ law does not conflict with international 
law, then the international law will be followed. This is clearly not the case with the 
softwood lumber dispute, “which has led some Canadians to question whether the United 
States will comply with NAFTA if decisions by the dispute settlement mechanism run 
counter to private U.S. interests.” 81 
Highlighting these divergent approaches to environmental policymaking at the 
international level, it is our goal to use the context of CEC—as defined by the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)—to show that the goals 
of the CEC are more aligned with Canada’s view of how we should approach regional 
environmental integration in the Americas. Furthermore, in completing such a 
comparison, we hypothesize that Canada’s actions in pursuing its multilateral agenda 
through the CEC has put Canada in a position to serve as a conduit for other countries in 
the Americas to participate with the United States in a meaningful way in formulating 
environmental policymaking in the region and hemisphere. 
We use three major documents to conduct a straightforward analysis regarding 
Canadian values and the goals and vision of the CEC: the draft of the Strategic Plan of 
the Joint Public Advisory Committee 2006-2010 (November, 2005); the Strategic Plan of 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2005-2010 (17 June 2005) and the 
Report of the Ten-year Review and Assessment Committee to the Council of the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (15 June 2004).82 The draft JPAC Strategic 
Plan was designed to supplement the CEC’s strategic plan and is based on the principles 
of transparency, outreach, and engagement. The Strategic Plan of the CEC purports to 
provide a vision for the future of the CEC as well as setting priorities for the CEC’s long-
term viability. The Ten-year Review provides a comprehensive critique of the CEC 
authored by six individuals: Pierre Marc Johnson and Robert Page of Canada, Jennifer A. 
                                                 
80 David Suzuki Foundation, The Maple Leaf in the OECD: Comparing Progress Toward Sustainability 
(Vancouver: David Suzuki Foundation, 2005), 6. 
81 John Manley, Pedro Aspe, Robert A. Pastor, and William F. Weld, Building a North American 
Community: Report of the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2005), 16. 
82 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Our Future Within the CEC: Strategic Plan of the Joint 
Public Advisory Committee 2006-2010 (Montreal: CEC, 2005), 1-11; Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation, 2004, 1-76; Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Looking to the Future: Strategic 
Plan of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 2005-2010 (Montreal: CEC, 2005), 1-20. 
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Haverkamp and John F. Mizroch of the United States, and Daniel Basurto and Blanca 
Torres of Mexico. The report offers both an assessment of the CEC and recommendations 
for the future. 
Throughout the earlier sections of this manuscript we have cited many descriptions of 
how Canada and the United States are perceived with respect to their outlooks on 
approaching environmental policymaking at the international level. The United States 
was described within the context of such terminology as unilateralism, American 
exceptionalism, and U.S.-centered bilateralism, while Canada was described in terms of 
such things as multilateralism, inclusiveness, and global interdependence. What we do 
next is delineate some of the words commonly used throughout the draft of JPAC’s 
Strategic Plan, the CEC’s Strategic Plan and Ten-year Review to show that these 
documents, and hence the CEC, tends more toward the Canadian outlook than the United 
States’ outlook. 
 
The Draft JPAC Strategic Plan  
 
• promotes “continental cooperation”  
• advocates building “a tri-national model of collaboration, consensus building, and 
consensus-based results”  
 
The Strategic Plan of the CEC 
• proclaims the need to “build bridges among the three countries to promote 
environmental collaboration”  
• establishes the CEC as a way to “facilitate cooperation on the conservation, 
protection, and enhancement of the North American environment”  
• refers to the CEC Council operating “on the basis of consensus”  
• declares a need for “regional and national coordination”  
• describes the CEC as “a forum through which we can discuss and facilitate 
regional action on our common global commitments”  
 
The Ten-year Review  
• speaks of “the unprecedented commitment by the three governments to account 
internationally for the enforcement of their environmental laws” 
• promotes the CEC as an “international model” 
• asserts that the CEC facilitates “more fluid cooperation among the Parties…and 
their various stakeholder groups by broadening their relationships and increasing 
the number and range of their contracts” 
• highlights the importance of “a North American environmental community” 
• notes the CEC’s presence as a “safe harbor” forum to discuss issues and a “neutral 
forum” for examining emerging and complex issues 
• remarks on North America as “a collection of linked ecosystems” 
• maintains that part of the mission of the CEC is to “create a sense of regional 
environmental consciousness” 
• expresses the hope that the countries can work on a “consensual basis” while 
pursuing “a trilateral agenda that at least purports to benefit all three countries 
equally” along “a common agenda” 
 11
 
Further, in commenting upon the CEC’s weaknesses and failures, the Ten-year Review 
 
• posits that the main CEC stakeholders “have not been able to develop a common 
vision about the CEC mandate or their respective roles” 
• proclaims the United States as “the dominant partner” with “greater influence”  
• criticizes the fact that, even after a decade of efforts, the three countries still 
“pursue their trade and environmental policies largely separately rather than 
through the CEC” 
• points out that “United States agencies still see little value added in the CEC for 
their program areas” and that the “interest of United States NGOs [in the CEC] 
has declined” 
 
We believe there is a clear pattern of ideas and concepts that pervade the CEC 
mission and goals as demonstrated by its public reports. Words and phrases such as 
building bridges, promotion of environmental collaboration, facilitating cooperation, 
consensus building, broadening relationships, consensual decision-making, and common 
agenda all relate to Canada’s emphasis on inclusiveness with respect to environmental 
policy making. Words and phrases such as North American environment, common global 
commitment, and common vision relate to Canada’s emphasis on global interdependence. 
Words and phrases such as regional coordination, international accountability, 
international models, North American environmental community, and regional 
environmental consciousness relate to Canada’s emphasis on multilateralism. In short, the 
mission and goals of the CEC are a strong reflection of the values and ideals that Canada 
brings to the bargaining table. 
 
The Canadian Difference 
Canada and the United States share a rich tradition of cooperation with respect to 
environmental policymaking. In fact, Canada and the United States have been partners in 
some of the world’s oldest international environmental treaties.83 This tradition is being 
carried forward within the trilateral framework of NAFTA, with “huge importance” 
placed on environmental cooperation.84 Yet, despite the impact of NAFTA, governance 
in North America appears to be comprised of “asymmetric dyads” entrenched within a 
system of bilateralism.85 The bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States 
remains a potent force in all policymaking,86 albeit, it is a bilateral relationship of 
disproportionate framing, with United States domestic policy serving as the driving 
force.87 
Having said all that, Canada—through its ever-present efforts to push the values of 
multilateralism and inclusiveness—plays a substantial role in promoting the need for 
                                                 
83 Scott Vaughan, “North American Environmental Cooperation and NAFTA,” in The Art of the State II, 
eds. Thomas Courchene, Donald Savois, and Daniel Schwanen (Montreal: Institute for Research and Public 
Policy, 2004), 3. 
84 Cellucci. 
85 Clarkson and Banda, 313. 
86 Hart, 25. 
87 Debora VanNijnatten, “Analyzing the Canada-U.S. Environmental Relationship: A Multi-Faceted 
Approach,” American Review of Canadian Studies 33, no. 1 (2003): 94. 
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solving environmental problems within a regional or international context, rather than 
relying solely on the seemingly entrenched system of bilateralism. Canada does so in two 
major ways that have influence within the Americas. First, Canada plays a highly visible 
and public role in regional and international environmental policy venues. Moreover, 
there is concrete evidence that the values that Canada portrays as important are being 
institutionalized in the processes of organizations (e.g., the CEC) whose primary mission 
is to ensure that environmental protection remains a central consideration in all North 
American policymaking. The draft of the JPAC Strategic Plan, the Strategic Plan of the 
CEC and the Ten-year Review of the CEC (as documented above) reflect the values that 
Canada portrays as necessary to solving environmental problems across the Americas. 
Clearly, the goals and mission of the CEC tend toward collaboration and coordination 
within a framework of consensus among many countries, with no single country attaining 
a position of dominance within the organization. 
While it is easy to argue that the actual implementation of environmental policy 
within the CEC remains skewed toward United States domestic policymaking (as noted 
by the criticism delineated in the Ten-year Review), the simple fact remains that the 
language defining how the CEC is to be organized and administered represents 
multilateral ideals at their best. This is no small accomplishment. The United States has 
signed on to work within this framework and despite the United States tendency to go its 
own way at times, to retain some semblance of credibility, the United States still must 
respond to the rules that govern the CEC in a meaningful way. And these are rules that 
encompass a common (not unilateral) vision for environmental policymaking. 
The second way that Canada influences environmental policy in the Americas is by 
serving as a role model for how other countries can approach the influence and power of 
the United States. There certainly is not any doubt that the United States plays the 
dominant role in policymaking across the world today (including the Americas), be it 
economically, militarily, or environmentally. Within this current system of policymaking, 
Canada manages to publicize its strong commitment to multilateral values as a counter-
balance to the unilateral power of the United States. Further, Canada does so within the 
context of maintaining a close, friendly, and respectful relationship with the United 
States. 
Bilateral-type relationships remain the way the United States likes to deal with its 
regional partners. However, the United States is being pulled more and more in the 
direction of regional affiliations that recognize the value of consensus building and 
participation by all countries on equal terms. This is certainly true in the Americas. This 
movement, in our opinion, is in no small way related to the persistence of Canada in 
using its unique relationship with the United States to champion multilateralism over 
unilateralism and inclusiveness over exceptionalism.  
In this regard, Canada has chosen to remain engaged with the United States at all 
levels. While Canada retains its important bilateral linkages to the United States, it also 
continues to actively push the United States toward the ideals of multilateralism. Canada 
values the recognition it receives within the world community as both a leader in 
environmental protection and a country willing to work with weaker nations. Canada uses 
this recognition, along with its proximity and strong positive ties with the United States, 
to champion the ideals of multilateralism as one way the United States (and all other 
countries in the Americas) can address domestic and regional environmental problems. In 
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doing so, Canada brings external pressure on the United States to at least recognize the 
values that are important to other countries in the Americas, all of which are considerably 
weaker than the United States in most important considerations. In essence, Canada—
because of its unique position vis-a vis the United States and its public rhetoric 
trumpeting inclusiveness, cooperation, and interdependence—offers hope that positive 
multilateral engagement with the United States is a realistic possibility. 
It is certainly too strong a statement to say that the United States will soon abandon 
the way it unilaterally views the world and accept Canada’s slant on the benefits of 
multilateralism. But in hopes of ultimately changing the tone of the debate in its favor, 
Canada continues to push its multilateral values onto the North American environmental 
policymaking agenda through its active participation in NAFTA, NAAEC, and the CEC. 
In this way, Canada can confront the United States and its immense powers within 
institutions designed to treat nations on an equal basis. While these efforts may not bring 
about instantaneous changes in United States policy positions, it does allow for Canada to 
openly espouse its views in hopes of bringing about such change. This use of multilateral 
institutions by Canada to foster values it considers important should not be overlooked by 
other countries in the Americas hoping to become part of the environmental 
policymaking process. 
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